Knowledge is not Information: The Epistemic Repertoire from a Radical Behaviorist Perspective

Abstract

This article discusses the concept of knowledge from the radical behaviorist perspective presented by B. F. Skinner in the Knowing chapter of About Behaviorism. First, I contrast the radical behaviorist conception of knowledge with the representational-informational view, highlighting the latter’s logical and conceptual difficulties. Then, I explore the relationship between knowledge and complex contingencies, proposing three fundamental characteristics of operant behavior patterns typically recognized as knowledge: temporal consistency of success, covariation with environmental changes, and adherence to shared activity criteria. I argue that this perspective avoids the intellectualist legend implicit in representationalist theories. Finally, I apply this radical behaviorist conception of knowledge to two contemporary contexts: the spread of misinformation on social media and the epistemic recognition of Indigenous and traditional knowledge systems. In both cases, I demonstrate that understanding knowledge as a behavioral repertoire selected by complex contingencies (rather than as mere information) provides a more accurate interpretation of these phenomena and supports fairer acknowledgement of diverse epistemic systems.